We expand the traditional tax incentive redundancy argument by investigating the implications of allocating incentives primarily to firms that would have invested even in the absence of special tax treatment. Incorporating government revenue constraints, pliable tax officials, endogenous tax liabilities, and firms with heterogeneous before-tax returns, we show that tax incentives, if given to the "wrong" firms, are not only ineffective in stimulating FDI, but result in a form of tax shifting and may reduce FDI. Data from countries of the former Eastern Bloc suggests that tax incentive schemes have significantly negative impacts on FDI in countries that poorly target firms.
Introduction
Governments often seek to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) by offering tax incentives for firms. While there seems to be a consensus view that the level of tax rates in host countries is a significant factor in explaining cross-country patterns in FDI (Hines, 1999) , 1 the more limited evidence for tax incentives suggests that the effects in most countries are either small or nonexistent (Shah, 1995) . The problem is usually redundancy (Usher, 1977) .
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Redundancy arises because investment tax incentives often are offered to all (or targeted to a select group of) firms, but will affect the behavior only of those firms for which the host country is marginally the most preferred (profitable) location for investment. Those firms for which the host country has a clear advantage would likely have invested even in the absence of the tax incentive. They receive a windfall gain, a rent, from the tax incentives without changing their behavior. Therefore the level of FDI is not affected significantly by the presence of incentives.
This paper argues that this is not the complete story. Offering incentives may in fact reduce the level of FDI in the host country if the tax burden on firms that do not receive incentives increases when other firms do receive incentives. This would be the case if the host country provides a certain level of services, the cost of which increases in the number of economic agents. In that case, the tax expenditure of the incentive must be offset by higher tax revenue collected from firms not receiving the tax incentive. The greater tax burden on firms that 1 Due in large part to data limitations, much of the literature that investigates the relationship between tax rates and FDI focuses on the United States, either the flows of FDI into the U.S. or the investment of U.S. firms abroad (Hines, 1999) . Devereux and Freeman (1995) , Hines (1998) , and Chen et al. (1998) are among the exceptions.
do not receive incentives may deter them from investing, although they would have invested if the tax levy were spread out more evenly across firms in the absence of incentives. In that environment, providing incentives to the "wrong" firms results in a lower level of FDI compared to a case where no incentives are offered.
In the next section we present a simple model of such an environment. We then test the predictions of the model using data from the former Eastern Bloc countries. The data reveal that in some countries, those with less developed institutions, offering incentives leads to lower FDI.
We conclude with final remarks.
2.
Tax incentives, endogenous taxes, and investment
An example
Governments seek to attract investment and sometimes use tax policy (e.g. tax exemptions) to help achieve this goal. Governments also seek to provide a certain level of public services, such as a variety of legal and regulatory institutions, social services, and physical infrastructure. As suggested in the literature on congestible public goods (Berglas and Pines, 1981; Brueckner, 1997) , suppose that the cost of providing public services (C) increases in the number of agents (N) in the economy. The cost of providing public services is met by tax revenue collected from those firms which do not receive exemptions and pay taxes. Revenue is collected in the form of a tax τ, which we assume is the same across tax-paying firms. Thus, the government budget constraint is given by:
where φN is the number of tax-paying firms. Solving for the tax liability yields:
The tax liability decreases with the share of firms paying taxes (φ). Now consider a case where a group of n firms are precommitted to operating in the 2 country and are ineligible for tax incentives. There are also two additional potential investors.
The country may either 1) not offer incentives to either of the two firms or 2) may offer an incentive to one of the two firms. From (2), the tax rate associated with the former case (no incentives) is lower compared to the case where an exemption is offered:
Suppose that one of the two potential investors finds it advantageous to invest in the country whether or not there are incentives. It would invest even if there is an exemption and it goes to the other firm, i.e. when it has to pay tax I τ (which implies a lower return net of taxes).
The second firm finds it profitable to invest in the country only if it receives an exemption. If there are no exemptions (and the tax rate is NI τ ), it is indifferent between investing in the country and investing elsewhere. Suppose that without an incentive it invests in the country with probability θ . Therefore, if the country offers no incentives, the expected number of firms is:
Let p be the probability that the second (marginally profitable) firm receives the incentive if there are incentives. Then, given incentives, the expected number of firms is:
From (3) and (4), the expected number of firms in a country that offers exemptions could be higher or lower than in a country that does not offer exemptions, depending on how effectively the exemptions are allocated. A country that offers exemptions mostly to firms which would invest anyway is likely to attract less investment compared to a country that does not offer exemptions at all ( θ < p ). Alternatively, offering exemptions increases overall investment if the exemptions go predominantly to firms that would not have invested otherwise. To summarize, our hypothesis is that the level of investment is greatest when countries offer incentives to firms that may not have invested without incentives, followed by the case when incentives are not offered at all, followed by the case when incentives go to firms which would have invested anyway.
A Bias In The Allocations of Limited Tax Incentives
Our simple model implies tax shifting can reduce overall FDI when there is a bias in the allocation of incentives toward the "wrong" firms. Under what circumstances would tax incentives be limited in number and their allocation biased in such a way that it deters overall levels of investment flows?
Eligibility requirements which limit their availability are standard in tax incentive programs. These requirements may be targeted to reduce tax avoidance or to promote investment in certain geographical areas, industries or activities. Their effect is to restrict the availability of tax incentives and to limit the number of firms which qualify. In certain situations this targeting can result in a biased allocation of the tax incentives toward the "wrong" firms, i.e. firms which would have invested with or without receiving the incentive. First, tax legislation may include exemptions explicitly targeted to activities which are location specific and associated with large rents, for example, a special exemption for investments by foreign oil companies. In such a situation, the incentives are purposefully allocated directly to the "wrong" firms, which does not change their behavior (and therefore increase the overall level of FDI).
A second combination of circumstances can also lead to a bias in the allocation of incentives to the wrong firms. In particular, when the investment is associated with location specific rents or quasi-rents, and poor institutional development allows for influence peddling, a bias in the allocation of incentives toward the wrong firms can occur. The presence of any targeted tax incentive requiring an official decision on eligibility may lead to rent-seeking behavior. Poorly defined, conflicting tax policies, combined with underdeveloped institutions such as a tax administration, provide an opportunity for self-interested tax officials to apply the tax law to the benefit of a particular firm at his or her discretion. Tanzi (1998) cites both tax incentives and poorly developed tax administration institutions as "governmental activities
[which] create a fertile ground for corruption" (10) (11) 14) .
If influence peddling is costly, in terms of payments to officials, lobbying efforts, etc., it is those firms for which the host country offers a significant advantage that will be more willing to bear the cost. Tanzi and Zee (2000) argue, by exempting profits irrespective of their amount, "tax holidays tend to benefit an investor who expects high profits and would have undertaken the investment even if there were no such incentives" (316). More profitable firms have a greater motivation to invest in lobbying efforts to receive a profit tax exemption. High profitability, in and of itself, however, does not imply a detrimental bias in the awarding of tax incentives. To the extent that highly profitable companies are highly mobile and their location decisions can be affected by the tax incentive offers, these are the "right" firms and tax incentives, whether offered legitimately or as the results of influence peddling, can have a positive effect on the overall level of FDI. 4 It is only when profits are generated by location specific assets or when quasi-rents are involved that a negative bias in the allocation of incentives would be expected to arise.
When investments generate high profits and these profits are the result of locationspecific advantages, firms are likely to invest whether or not they receive any tax incentive and are the "wrong" firms to receive tax incentives. The location specific advantages imply a rent to investment in a particular host country and this rent provides both the resources and the motive to engage in influence peddling. When tax officials have discretion and can be influenced, then these are the firms most likely to receive the incentives and are exactly the "wrong" firms, firms which would have invested in this country even if they did not receive any tax incentives.
And, it is not only highly profitable firms which may be willing to bear the cost of 3 Tanzi (1998), pp. 10-11, 14.
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However, as these highly mobile firms have no preference for a particular country, they may avoid the cost of influence peddling, relying instead on competition among competing host countries to provide them with tax incentives to locate in a particular country. influence peddling to attract tax incentives. Other types of investments may be location specific, such as activities associated with immobile assets. Once initial investments have been made, the immobile asset provides the country with a distinct advantage over similar investments by the same firm in an alternative country. The quasi-rents associated with this immobile asset provide opportunities for corrupt officials in situations of discretion to extract those quasi-rents in exchange for tax incentives, even when the country continues to have locational advantages and the investments likely would have been made without further incentives.
Some support for this phenomenon is found in Marceau and Smart (2003) , who show that tax preferences may indeed be targeted to industries in which capital investments are less mobile.
In principle, one would expect that, once made, these immobile investments would be taxed heavily (termed "the capital levy problem"). Marceau and Smart (2003) show, however, that the immobility of their investment is also a strong incentive for firms to lobby against such future tax increases. In fact, it is possible that firms with immobile investments may more successfully lobby for lower taxes than other firms with more mobile investments.
There is evidence that much of the foreign investment in the transition economies has been driven by location-specific factors such as attractive privatization deals, natural resources, new markets, or geographical location close to European Union markets (see Resami, 2000) .
Investment in the service sector clearly targets the domestic market and this can comprise a large proportion of inward investment flows. Using detailed data, Altzinger (1998) , shows, for example, that 62.1 percent of Austrian FDI in the transition economies of Central Europe was in service sectors such as finance, trade, and real estate. Resami (2000) reports that less than 5 percent of foreign investment in manufacturing has been in the high-tech sector. To determine whether such circumstances actually reduce FDI, we turn to an empirical investigation of the data. 6 3.
Empirical Specification and Data
We empirically test the conceptual model described above by examining the impact of tax incentives on FDI in the former communist countries of the Eastern Bloc. While this restricted sample limits the number of available observations, it offers several advantages.
Perhaps most importantly, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), and other organizations have made an effort to collect comparable data on these countries. There are many problems with data from this area as with data from any sample of countries. However, these organizations have sought to create a consistent set of numbers, facilitating analysis. The transition economies are interesting from a policy perspective given their efforts to develop market economies. An evaluation of the effectiveness of tax incentives is important in these economies where the tax systems are undergoing major transformations, tax collection is a continuing struggle, and public sector spending is relatively large.
The sample is also unique because of the many similarities in the starting points of these countries and the variety of experiences since transition. In broad terms, prior to transition, FDI in these countries was relatively low, and they had tax regimes that were based on a socialist ideology that did not recognize standard market practices. With the change in regimes, these countries had a virtually universal desire to attract FDI. Many adopted tax incentives. Some countries kept the incentives in all years, some countries abandoned the incentives, and some countries reinstated them in later years. They also had different experiences in terms of institutional development providing for much variation across countries and over time in the efficiency of allocation of incentives (p). In terms of FDI, the success has also varied greatly.
FDI as a percent of GDP during the period 1993-1998, ranged from as low as 0.15 percent in Belarus to as high as 8.31 percent in Azerbaijan. 
Key Variables and Descriptive Analysis
We identify which countries use tax incentives to attract investment utilizing tax summaries published by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). The IBFD ceased publication of this document in 1999, and thus 1998 are the latest available data. Tax laws can be quite detailed and elaborate. For example, most countries have adopted some form of tax holidays, but the particular design of this tax incentive varies significantly in detail. Some countries have a minimum investment amount in order for the incentives to apply, and sometimes that amount is in domestic currency. Others apply the incentive to a portion of the firm. Because the translation of this qualitative data into quantitative measures is bound to have some degree of arbitrariness, we construct dummy variables for whether or not a country offers special tax exemptions for firms with foreign participation (inc). Data sources and sample statistics for this and the other variables are found in Table 1.   5 Our conceptual model implies targeted tax incentives will be effective in attracting foreign firms, i.e., increasing overall FDI, only if the country has a relatively high p, where p is the probability that a marginal firm receives a tax incentive. A high p indicates that incentives go mostly to firms that would not invest otherwise. We hypothesize that incentive allocation is less efficient, that is, p is smaller, in countries with underdeveloped institutional structure. A direct measure of institutional development is derived from a measure of progress in transition developed by the EBRD, which gauges progress in legal reform. An additional measure is an index of civil liberties published by Freedom House (Karatnycky, 1999) . Our proxy for p in the empirical analysis is an aggregate of these two variables (using principle components) that is normalized to fall on the unit interval.
We also considered countries offering incentives for new investment, regardless of the source of the funds. However, nearly all countries which offered this incentive also offered tax incentives for foreign firms. In fact, many countries offered incentives for foreign firms and no incentives for new firms. That may reflect the belief of the governments in that region that important investments will have to come primarily from abroad. Given the small size of the data set and the close structure of the two types of incentives, we included only the variable for incentives to foreign firms.
We use annual FDI as a percentage of GDP as our measure of investment inflows. Often there are substantial differences between countries in how they treat investment, and in particular, FDI. Examples include distinctions between capital alteration and maintenance, work in progress and investment, and valuation changes on existing assets (EBRD, 1998) . Accounting for inventories and depreciation is also problematic, especially in an inflationary environment. While these differences often are difficult to uncover, the EBRD has nevertheless constructed a data set for transition countries that attempts to account for them. We use their data on the dollar value of FDI as a ratio of GDP. Ideally, we would like to have a fuller measure of inbound activity that includes, for example, assets of foreign firms obtained by local borrowing. Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (2001) use the end-of-year depreciable assets and inventories of US subsidiaries abroad to measure foreign activity. These data are obtained from the balance sheets of U.S. parent companies. Such data are not available for the countries we study. We should point out however that because of the generally low level of financial development in the transition economies, the potential for large local borrowing by multinationals is small.
To provide further motivation, we use the measures for tax incentives and p to divide countries into three groups: those that generally offered incentives during the sample period (during at least half of the years) and in addition had a relatively high (above the mean) level of institutional development; countries that did not generally offer incentives; and countries that offered incentives and had relatively low level of institutional development. Table 2 shows the average level of FDI for each of the three groups. As our model suggests, the largest inflow of investment occurred in the first group (3.06 percent of GDP) followed by the second group (2.46 percent) followed by countries with incentives and weak institutions (1.85 percent). The empirical analysis below provides further formal tests of these relationships.
Empirical Model
An empirically verifiable formulation of the conceptual model presented in section 2 is 9 given by:
where FDI i,t is foreign direct investment inflow to country i in year t, GDP i,t is the gross domestic product of country i in year t, inc i,t captures the availability of tax incentives, p i,t is a proxy measure of the variable p, and X i,t is a vector of control variables.
From (5), the effect of tax incentives on FDI is given by
Based on our discussion in section 2, we should expect that for low values of p the impact of incentives on FDI will be negative, while for high values of p the impact of tax incentives on FDI will be positive. In other words, we can formulate the following hypotheses:
An issue of concern is the potential endogeneity of the incentives variable (inc). Not only is FDI expected to be affected by the presence of tax incentives, but countries with low FDI may be more likely to institute incentives. To remedy the problem, we adjust the timing of our variables to account for the potential endogeneity. Specifically, we pair the availability of tax incentives on December 31 of each year with FDI flows for the succeeding year. We estimate equation (5) with generalized least squares allowing for heterogeneity across the countries and serial correlation.
Control Variables
We use as additional control variables a number of variables shown to affect FDI inflows (see Edmiston, Mudd, and Valev, 2003) . Included in the analysis are the EBRD's Progress in Transition Indicators. We utilize a principal components aggregate of the assessments of reform in each of 8 areas (transition). 6 We also include the log of the annual rate of CPI inflation (infl) to proxy for macroeconomic stability and per-capita gross domestic product (gdppc) to proxy for labor costs. GDP growth is used as an indication that the host country is an attractive target market for the output of the firm. The potential of the host country to serve as a platform for exports is proxied by openness, the sum of exports and imports as a ratio to GDP (trade). We add our proxy for p to capture any independent effects of institutional development on FDI. We also include a dummy variable for the presence of large oil and gas reserves (gas).
Previous studies have indicated that profits tax rates can affect FDI (see for example Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon 2001) . We use two different measures. From the IBFD tax summaries we derive the average statutory tax rate as the average of the highest and lowest statutory profits tax rates included in the law (avg tax). This variable is available for all years and countries in the sample but it suffers from the disadvantage that statutory rates may not be a very good measure for the effective tax burden as the definition of tax bases differ across countries. Schaffer and Turley (2001) report a large discrepancy between the two in the transition economies. As an alternative we use the ratio of total tax revenues to GDP as a measure of the effective tax rate (eff tax). Data on tax revenue from the IMF Government Finance Statistics are not available for a number of countries in the early transition years, which reduces the number of observations by close to 30 percent. We first report a model without using these variables and later add them.
Empirical Results
The empirical results of estimating equation (5) are presented in Table 3 . Model 1 is a
The 8 indicators are: large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. For a complete description, see EBRD (1999) . specification including only the variables inc, inc·p, and the control variables. Models 2 and 3 include the tax rate variables. Results from models 1 and 2 suggest that the degree to which a country is rules-based and unfavorable to outside influence of public officials is an important determinant of the effectiveness of tax incentive programs. In both specifications we find that the coefficient on the incentives variable, γ 1 < 0 and the coefficient on the interaction term, γ 2 > 0, both at the 99 percent confidence level. This suggests that tax incentives have a significantly negative effect on FDI for p = 0, and that the negative impact is decreasing in p. Further, our estimates of the interaction term γ 2 are larger in magnitude than are the parameter estimates for inc (γ 1 ), which suggests that there is some critical value of p for which the transition countries of Europe and Central Asia see a positive impact of tax incentives on FDI.
7 Specifically, Model 1 suggest that our composite index of progress in legal reform and civil liberties would have to approach about 0.79 (3.14/3.97) before tax incentives would effectively raise FDI in these countries. Model 2 suggest that this threshold value is about 0.86 (2.99/3.47). In our sample, the index value of p exceeds the middle of the range defined by these numbers (0.825) in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland. Bulgaria and Slovenia are marginally above this level (0.84 and 0.83, respectively).
Even in cases where countries are highly rules-based, the effects of tax incentives on FDI appear to be small. On average, when p is very close to 1 (as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) countries employing tax incentives would be expected to see an FDI/GDP ratio 0.83 percentage points (3.97 -3.14) greater than the ratio in countries which do not use tax incentives. However, the potentially negative impact of incentives and weak institutions is much larger. When p is close to 0 (as in Turkmenistan) offering incentives reduces the FDI/GDP ratio by 3.14 percentage points. See Table 4 for a summary of these effects.
The remaining control variables generally have the expected effects. Macroeconomic
In Model 1 we could statistically reject the equality (in magnitude) of γ 1 and γ 2 with 94 percent confidence. Model 2 provided a much weaker result, as we could reject the null only at the 88 percent confidence level stability measured by low inflation is an important positive influence on foreign investment. The progress in transition variable is also positive and statistically significant. Higher labor costs measured by GDP per capita are associated with lower foreign investment. More open economies and those with greater endowment of natural resources receive more investment. The coefficient on p as a separate regressor was found to be statistically insignificant in all specifications. Model 2 provides some evidence that high statutory tax rates are associated with lower investment. In Model 3, the effective tax rate measured as the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is not statistically significant. That may be due to the smaller number of observations. In that model, the incentives variables are also not statistically significant although their signs are the same as in Models 1 and 2.
5.
Learning about whether or not to offer incentives.
Our results suggest that countries with weaker institutions (low p) should not offer incentives. The experience of the transition economies is interesting as in the early years none of the governments had prior experience which could guide them in the decision whether or not to offer incentives. Over time, one could expect that policy makers would become aware of how problems in the institutional structure of the country can influence the effectiveness of incentives. Has there been such learning? Table 5 shows the prevalence of incentives and the flows of FDI in high p (p > 0.825) and low p countries. In general, countries with low p were more likely to offer incentives in the early transition years. Over time, countries with stronger institutions (high p) became more likely to offer incentives while low p countries became less likely to offer incentives. Excluding countries with substantial natural resources, by the end of the period in 1998, high p countries were more likely to offer incentives compared to low p countries. This indicates there may be some learning by policy makers on whether or not to offer incentives. If the effectiveness of incentives in raising overall FDI were the only consideration, we would expect convergence to an optimum in which only countries with high p would offer 13 incentives. However, as targeted incentives are usually instituted to accomplish other goals as well, policy makers would have to weigh the benefits of these goals against the effects on overall investment. Still, the trend for increased prevalence of incentives in high p countries and the decreasing trend in low p countries suggest that policy makers are becoming more aware that tradeoffs are involved.
An additional interesting observation from Table 5 is that in the low p group, the prevalence of incentives declines only for countries that do not have large natural resources. The countries with large endowments were more likely than other countries to offer incentives throughout the period. This observation fits with the finding of Marceau and Smart (2003) that industries with immobile investments (such as oil and gas) may lobby strongly and obtain preferential tax treatment.
Concluding Remarks
This paper constructs a model whereby the efficiency with which firms are targeted for incentives plays an important role in the success or failure of development policies. While conventional wisdom suggests that tax incentives will have little or no stimulative effect on FDI if incentives are not well-targeted to avoid the problem of redundancy, our results suggest that poor allocations of incentives may in fact lead to a situation in which tax incentives deter FDI.
Using panel data from the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia, where we believe there to be significant variation in the quality of incentive allocations among firms, we present empirical evidence that lends support to this view.
These results have important policy implications for countries attempting to attract FDI.
The effectiveness of tax incentives in attracting FDI depends on the ability of the countries to allocate the incentives to marginal firms. This depends crucially on well-designed institutions to administer policies. Otherwise, regardless of the intention of incentive targeting, the allocation of incentives may be hijacked by firms which would have invested even without the benefit of tax 14 incentives.
Related to our paper is Wei's (2001) hypothesis that weak institutions may lead to more rather than less foreign investment: corruption may allow investors to negotiate away high taxes or capital controls. He characterizes this kind of corruption as a theory of "efficient grease payments" (p. 74). However, he finds no empirical support for this hypothesis, which lends some credence to our alternative hypothesis. In our framework, weak institutions, combined with the availability of tax incentives, leads to the worst investment outcome.
Additional, more detailed data may reveal more about the mechanisms by which tax shifting might occur. Our contention is that, given the public sector cost imposed by new firms, governments will attempt to shift tax liabilities from firms that receive incentives to ones that do not. How is this accomplished in countries where governments have difficulty collecting revenue from any firm? Anecdotal evidence from the transition countries suggests that various fees and charges are used to compensate for the low success in collecting profits taxes. Thus, awarding an incentive in terms of a lower profits tax rate or exemption on one firm may be countered by increased levies on other tax bases on other firms. If, alternatively, a firm is given a profit tax exemption but the government recoups the lost revenue from that same firm in various fees (or customs duties for example), then the value of exemptions is small. Additional data of better quality and longer time series would allow for more precision in the estimates and would lend added confidence to the results. Notes: Threshold for strong/weak institutions is p = 0.579 (see Table 1 ). Incentives: a country is classified as offering incentives if it offered tax exemptions for firms with foreign participation in at least half of the years during the sample period. Notes: GLS estimation with country-specific effects. Standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) significant at the 1(5,10) percent level. 
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